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Articles
The "Cape Town Approach": A New Method
of Making International Law
MARK J. SUNDAHL*
The use of multilateral treaties in the field of
international commercial law has been in a state of
steady decline. Traditional treaty law has been
gradually replaced in recent years by softer methods
of making international law, such as the use of
restatements and model laws. Some scholars even
claim that treaty law is dead or dying. This Article
explains how the Cape Town Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment (which
entered into force on March 1, 2006) provides an
innovative approach to the creation of treaties that
promises to revive the status of treaties in
international law. The "Cape Town approach" to
treaty formation is characterized by a novel use of
protocols that brings new flexibility to the treaty
structure. This Article examines the Cape Town
Convention's use of protocols and explores the
potential of the "Cape Town approach" as a new tool
for making international law.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. Ph.D., Brown University; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. This Article benefited from the assistance of Martin Stanford of UNIDROIT who
generously provided me with unpublished documents from the UNIDROIT archives. I
would also like to thank Jeffrey A. Wool, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP, and counsel to the
Aircraft Working Group, for sharing his recollections about the treaty negotiations described
herein. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the stipend granted by
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in support of this research.
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INTRODUCTION
The field of international commercial law has in recent years
turned away from traditional treaty law and has moved increasingly
toward "softer" methods of harmonizing commercial law around the
world. Some commentators have even claimed that treaty law, with
respect to commercial issues as well as other areas of law, is dead or
dying.1 The "softer" methods that have begun to take the place of
treaties include model laws and restatements that promote uniformity
among domestic legal systems by providing guidelines for the
creation of national laws.2  However, these soft approaches to
harmonization are inferior to treaty law in the sense that they serve
1. See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International
Commercial Law, 23 J.L. & COM. 117, 132 (2004); Charles N. Brower, The International
Treaty-Making Process: Paradise Lost, or Humpty Dumpty?, in MULTILATERAL TREATY-
MAKING 75, 75 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2000).
2. Brower, supra note 1, at 79. Both UNIDROIT and the Commission on European
Contract Law have created restatements of contract law. UNIDROIT, Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (1994), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/main.htm; The Commission on European Contract Law, Principles of European
Contract Law (1998), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/Im/eu.contract.principles.1998/
doc.html#29. For a discussion of current experiments with model laws in the area of
commercial law, see infra Part II.A. UNIDROIT is the acronym for the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, an independent intergovernmental organization
which is based in Rome and dedicated to the modernization and harmonization of
commercial law around the world. The UNIDROIT homepage can be accessed at
http://www.unidroit.org.
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merely as recommendations for the reform of national law and do not
constitute binding law that guarantees uniformity. In contrast, a
multilateral treaty creates a uniform system of law that all states party
to the treaty are required to enforce. The decline of treaties in the
area of commercial law has resulted from the extreme difficulty of
reaching agreement among various nations regarding rules that would
govern commercial transactions. The great rift between the common
law and the civil law has foiled attempts at global harmonization and
many of the treaties that have been concluded now languish due to a
failure to achieve broad ratification by the family of industrial
nations. 3
This dismal outlook for the future of treaty law was recently
brightened by a new method of structuring treaties that was created in
the process of drafting the Cape Town Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment (hereinafter referred to as the Cape
Town Convention), which entered into force on March 1, 2006.4
This novel method of forming treaties, which I shall refer to as the
"Cape Town approach," promises to rescue treaty law from its
current malaise by introducing greater flexibility into the structure of
treaties which can facilitate the resolution of disputes that threaten to
stall a treaty negotiation.
The Cape Town Convention, drafted under the auspices of
UNIDROIT, imposes a new legal regime for the creation and
enforcement of "international interests" in highly mobile, ultra-
expensive goods, specifically, aircraft, trains, and space assets. 5
These "international interests" include security interests, the interest
3. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 152-54.
4. Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 108-10, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-
main.htm [hereinafter Cape Town Convention]. Although the third instrument of ratification
required for the Cape Town Convention's entry into force was deposited on November 16,
2001, under its unique rules the Convention will only enter into force when one of its
supplementary protocols enters into force (and then only with respect to that particular
protocol). Id. art. 49(1); see also UNIDROIT, Status of the Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-
2001-convention.pdf. Under its provisions, the Protocol to the Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (hereinafter, the
Aircraft Protocol) will enter into force three months after the deposit of its eighth instrument
of ratification. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, art. XXVIII(I), Nov. 16, 2001, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 108-10, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm
[hereinafter Aircraft Protocol]. On November 2, 2005, Malaysia became the eighth country
to ratify the Aircraft Protocol. See UNIDROIT, Status of the Protocol to the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2001-aircraftprotocol.pdf. For
further discussion regarding the convention's entry into force, see infra Part III.B.
5. Cape Town Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2)-(3).
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of a lessor under a lease agreement, and the interest of a seller under
a title reservation agreement. 6  The convention's impressive
achievement in harmonizing this area of commercial law has been
celebrated widely in existing literature. However, little attention has
been given to what is perhaps the more important contribution of the
Cape Town Convention to the field of international law, namely, the
convention's innovative structure which promises to have a profound
effect on the future formation of international law.
The Cape Town Convention's structure is unique with respect
to the unparalleled use of supplementary protocols. The convention
consists of a base convention that will operate in conjunction with
three (and perhaps even more) protocols. 7 The base convention
contains the bulk of those fundamental rules that are common to all
industries covered by the convention. However, the base convention
is also subject to industry-specific protocols that contain rules
applicable to a particular industry. 8 This unique structure provided
the flexibility needed to respond to the idiosyncratic needs of the
different industries involved in the drafting of the convention. As
described in greater detail below, such flexibility is a radical
departure from traditional approaches to treaty formation because it
promotes specialization of the law and speed of implementation
while sacrificing, to some degree, the traditional goal of uniformity.
Existing publications regarding the Cape Town Convention
were generally written during the convention's drafting process by
those involved in the negotiations in order to inform the legal world
about the status of the project and to voice various views concerning
outstanding issues that were being debated in the course of the
negotiations. 9  These articles frequently call attention to the
6. Id. art. 2(2).
7. The Cape Town Convention was ground-breaking in other respects as well, such as
the degree to which private industry was involved in the drafting process, and the
unparalleled primacy placed on commercial expediency over the more traditional approach
of harmonization (which is guided by the idea of drafting a treaty representing a common
ground, or compromise, between the common law and civil law systems). See Sandeep
Gopalan, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons from the Cape Town Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 9 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 255,268 (2003).
8. See Aircraft Protocol, supra note 4; see also Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters
Specific to Space Assets, UNIDROIT Study LXXIIJ-Doc. 13 rev. (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/workprogramme/study072/main.htm [hereinafter Space
Protocol]; Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock,
UNIDROIT Study LXXIIH-Doc. 14 (2003), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
publications/proceedings/2003/study/72h/72h- 14-e.pdf [hereinafter Rolling Stock Protocol].
9. Descriptive publications written by principal figures in the drafting of the Cape
Town Convention include the following: Martin J. Stanford, Completion of a First Draft of
UNIDROIT's Planned Future Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 2
UNIF. L. REV. 274 (1996); Roy Goode, Transcending the Boundaries of Earth and Space:
[44:339
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innovative features of the Cape Town Convention, such as the
unprecedented involvement of industry in the drafting process.10
However, little has been written about the convention's innovative
use of protocols, which was heralded as the convention's "most
striking" innovation by Sir Roy Goode, who authored the official
commentary on the Cape Town Convention. 11  Nor has any
commentator yet explored the potential effect that this new technique
for structuring treaties (hereinafter referred to as the "Cape Town
approach") may have on the future of international law in a greater
sense. 12  This Article fills this gap in existing scholarship by
The Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 52 (1998); Ronald C.C. Cuming, The Draft UNIDROIT
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 30 UCC L. J. 365 (1998);
Jeffrey Wool, The Next Generation of International Aviation Finance Law: An Overview of
the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment as
Applied to Aircraft Equipment, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 499 (1999); Lorne S. Clark, The
2001 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and Aircraft
Equipment Protocol: Internationalising Asset-Based Financing Principles for the
Acquisition of Aircraft and Engines, 69 J. AIR L. & CoM. 3 (2004).
Representative examples of analytical scholarship which evaluates the merits of the
convention in its formative stages and contains proposals for improvements to the draft
documents include the following: Jeffrey Wool, Rethinking the Notion of Uniformity in the
Drafting of International Commercial Law: A Preliminary Proposal for the Development of
a Policy-Based Unification Model, 2 UNIF. L. REV. 46 (1997); Jeffrey Wool, The Case for a
Commercial Orientation to the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention as Applied to Aircraft
Equipment, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79 (1999) [hereinafter Wool, Commercial
Orientation]; Martin J. Stanford, A Broader or Narrower Band of Beneficiaries for the
Proposed New International Regimen?: Some Reflections on the Merits of the
Convention/Protocol Structure in Facilitating the Former, 2 UNIF. L. REV. 242 (1999)
[hereinafter Stanford 1999]; Christine Chinkin & Catherine Kessedjian, The Legal
Relationship Between the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention and its Equipment-Specific
Protocols, 2 UNIF. L. REV. 323 (1999); Ronald C.C. Cuming, "Hot Issues" in the
Development of the (Draft) Convention International on Interests in Mobile Equipment and
the (Draft) Aircraft Equipment Protocol, 34 INT'L LAW. 1093 (2000) [hereinafter Cuming
2000].
10. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 4; Gopalan, supra note 7, at 270.
11. Goode, supra note 9, at 54. Commentators who have discussed, to some extent,
the Cape Town Convention's innovative use of protocols include: Wool, Commercial
Orientation, supra note 9, at 90; Clark, supra note 9, at 6; Chinkin & Kessedjian, supra note
9, at 323.
12. Other commentators have used a variety of terms to describe the unique use of
protocols in the Cape Town Convention, such as the "bifurcated approach," the "two-
instrument approach," the "convention-plus-protocol structure," and the "base/umbrella
convention plus equipment-specific protocols." See UNIDROIT Study LXXII-Doc. 32
(Dec. 1996) [hereinafter AWG/IATA Memo]; UNIDROIT EXPLANATORY REPORT AND
COMMENTARY, UNIDROIT Document DCME-IP/2 3, available at http://www.unidroit.org/
french/conventions/mobile-equipment/conference2001/conferencedocuments/ip-2-f.pdf
(2001); Roy GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN
MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATrERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT 7 (2002); Wool, Commercial Orientation, supra note 9, at 90, Clark, supra note
9, at 5; Cuming 2000, supra note 9, at 1100. However, these terms fail to distinguish the
unique nature of this new method of structuring a treaty from traditional convention/protocol
constructions, such as framework conventions and treaties that employ signature protocols.
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providing a thorough analysis of the mechanics of the Cape Town
approach while exploring its potential as a new tool for making
international law.
The first part of this Article provides a brief history of the
Cape Town Convention and describes the events leading to the
invention of the Cape Town approach. Part II describes the
mechanics of the Cape Town approach and compares the Cape Town
Convention's use of protocols to the traditional manner in which
protocols have been employed by treaties. Part III evaluates the
advantages and disadvantages of the Cape Town approach to making
international law. Finally, Part IV explains how the Cape Town
approach can be applied in future treaties by first enumerating the six
essential features of the Cape Town approach and then describing the
circumstances under which the Cape Town approach should be
adopted. This final section also provides several illustrative
examples of how the Cape Town approach can facilitate the creation
of treaties in such disparate areas as criminal law, environmental law,
and civil procedure.
I. THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION AND THE INVENTION OF THE
"CAPE TOWN APPROACH"
The Cape Town Convention is the most recent achievement
in a long-standing movement to create a modem and uniform
international law of secured transactions. The goal of creating a
uniform legal regime for the creation of security interests had for
many years proved elusive due to the sharp differences in domestic
laws and the implication of sensitive public policy issues. However,
the novel approach to treaty law that was taken by the drafters of the
Cape Town Convention overcame many of the difficulties that had
defeated earlier attempts at harmonization in this area of the law.
The following sections provide a concise history of prior attempts to
harmonize the law of secured transactions and describe the events
leading to the invention of the groundbreaking Cape Town approach.
This history is essential for understanding why the Cape Town
approach was adopted and how it can aid in the creation of future
treaties.
Therefore, the term "Cape Town approach" is used in this Article to refer to the unique base
convention/protocol structure found in the Cape Town Convention. For a more detailed
discussion of the traditional uses of protocols, see infra Part III.A.
[44:339
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A. Previous Efforts to Harmonize the Law of Secured
Transactions
A progressive law of secured transactions is an essential
component of a modern economy. Without a modem secured
transactions law, the capital required to support economic growth
would not be available since financial institutions are reluctant to
make loans that are not adequately secured on the debtor's assets.
Although the history of secured transactions has old roots in both the
civil law and the common law in the form of a chattel mortgage,
charge, pledge, or hypothecation, and, later, in the more sophisticated
form of conditional sales and title retention agreements, the
traditional approach to security interests in personal property has
been forced to undergo significant revision in order to meet the
requirements of modem finance. Among these requirements is the
need for (1) a non-possessory security interest, (2) clear priority rules
coupled with a public registration system to establish priority, (3)
prompt enforcement measures for the creditor marked by the ability
of the creditor to take possession of and sell the collateral upon the
debtor's default without a court order, and (4) the ability of a secured
creditor to enforce a security interest despite the debtor's bankruptcy.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United
States is the prime example of a modem statutory law of secured
transactions that embodies these principles. Article 9 was perhaps
the most revolutionary of the nine articles in the UCC. Rather than
simply codify the common law, the drafters freed themselves from
the strictures of tradition and drafted a new law that contemplated the
practical needs of the American commercial system. The resulting
statute reduced uncertainty for financiers by way of its clear "first to
file or perfect" priority rule and granted powerful remedies to
creditors to enable them to swiftly foreclose on collateral in the event
of default. Although decried by some as creditor-friendly, the statute
encouraged financial institutions to make loans and grant credit,
unleashing a stream of capital that contributed to the American post-
war boom in the 1950s.
The progressive nature of Article 9 stands in sharp contrast to
the law of secured transactions elsewhere in the world. Although
some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have adopted
similar statutes, many jurisdictions around the world retain a
traditional approach to secured transactions that fails to incorporate
one or more of the four fundamental principles of asset-backed
finance. For example, German law does not provide for the public
registration of security interests for purposes of establishing priority
and giving notice to prospective creditors of existing security
20061
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interests. 13 In India, although the judge-made law gives creditors the
nominal right to enforce a non-possessory security interest (known as
a hypothecation) without a court order, the reality is that a court order
is still generally required and the ensuing litigation can cause
sufficient delay so as to destroy the practical value of a security
interest. 14 This difficulty in creating and enforcing security interests
in personal property is a problematic area of commercial law not only
in India, but in many other developing countries as well. 15
This dismal state of secured transactions law on the global
level has had the sad result of slowing the flow of capital and limiting
the ability of entrepreneurs outside the United States to raise capital.
In order to improve this situation, efforts have been made on three
fronts to modernize the law of secured transactions around the world.
These efforts have involved the creation of multilateral treaties, the
promulgation of model laws, and the independent reform of domestic
law. Although these projects have brought some successes,
particularly in the area of aircraft finance, the history of international
secured transactions law is dotted with failures and has yet to
produce a comprehensive solution.
First, separate efforts have been made by the European
Economic Community, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the United Nations to create
multilateral treaties facilitating secured transactions. A binding
international treaty that has been broadly ratified around the world is
the holy grail of international secured finance because it brings with
it the greatest level of harmonization. The European attempt was
intended to harmonize the law of secured transactions among
European Union Member States by requiring that a security interest
created in one state be recognized and enforced in a second state as if
it were a security interest of an analogous type created in the second
state. 16 Although a draft convention was created in 1970, the project
was terminated due, in part, to the addition of the United Kingdom as
a Member State, which made the convention's analogy approach
13. See Hans-Joseph Vogel & Jan Becher, Germany, in 1 INTERNATIONAL SECURED
TRANSACTIONS GER- 16 (Oceana Publ'ns 2003).
14. See Asian Development Bank, Regional Technical Assistance Project No. 5795-
Reg, Insolvency Law Reforms, Report on India, Section C, available at
http://www.insolvencyasia.com/insolvency-law-regimes/india/sectionc.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2006).
15. See generally Nuria de ]a Pena, Reforming the Legal Framework for Security
Interests in Mobile Property, 2 UNIF. L. REv. 347 (1999).
16. See Stephen J. McGairl, The Proposed Unidroit Convention: International Law
for Asset Finance (Aircraft), 2 UNIF. L. REv. 439, 447 (1999).
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untenable. 17 Likewise, UNCITRAL made an ill-fated attempt to
achieve the lofty goal of drafting a broad international convention
that would apply to a wide variety of collateral. 18 The UNCITRAL
project stretched on for thirteen years (from 1968 through 1980), but
this attempt at creating a global law of secured transactions was
eventually "abandoned as being unattainable." 19 The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) enjoyed greater success with the
Geneva Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in
Aircraft, which currently boasts of having eighty-seven states as
parties. 20 However, the Geneva Convention only applies to security
interests in aircraft. Moreover, the effort has been of limited value
since a considerable number of important industrial countries,
including Canada, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, have
refused to ratify the convention, thus making the enforcement of
security interests in aircraft that land in those states less certain. 2 1
Finally, the United Nations oversaw the creation of the International
Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, opened for signature
in 1993, which created a reliable international legal regime for the
enforcement of security interests in ships. 22  However, this
convention has also suffered from a poor ratification record.23
Second, certain organizations have undertaken a softer
approach to harmonization by means of a model law of secured
transactions which could be either adopted "as is" by a country or,
alternatively, used as a template for developing a country's legal
regime. In 1994, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development promulgated a Model Law on Secured Transactions
intended for use by Central and Eastern European countries that were
in the process of modernizing their commercial laws.24 This model
law has been utilized successfully by various states in their efforts to
reform their economy. 25 A model law on secured transactions has
17. Id.
18. Id. at 447-48.
19. Id. at 448.
20. Geneva Convention on the International Recognition of Rights In Aircraft, June 19,
1948, 4 U.S.T. 1830, 310 U.N.T.S. 151. For the status of this convention, see the ICAO's
website at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/Genev.pdf.
21. McGairl, supra note 16, at 445.
22. International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, May 6, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 353 (1994).
23. Goode, supra note 9, at 56.
24. Model Law on Secured Transactions, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sectorlaw/st/core/modellaw/
model.pdf; see also Gopalan, supra note 1, at 129 n.60.
25. For the status of the various EBRD country projects for the reform of secured
transactions law, see Past and Current Projects, EBRD website at http://www.ebrd.com/
country/sector/law/st/new/projects/index.htm.
2006]
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also been published by the Organization of American States for use
by the countries of Latin America. 26
Third, certain countries have taken independent steps to
modernize their laws, as is the case in Mexico, which adopted a new
secured transactions law in May of 2000.27 This new law introduced
modern concepts of secured finance to Mexico, such as non-
possessory security interests, non-judicial foreclosure on collateral,
and a centralized registration system. 28
B. The Creation of the Cape Town Convention
The aspiration to create a multilateral international treaty on
secured transactions was revived in 1988 in the wake of the
diplomatic conference held in Ottawa for the signing of the
UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing and the
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring.29 It was at this
time that T.B. Smith, QC, the Canadian member of the UNIDROIT
Governing Council, proposed that UNIDROIT explore the feasibility
of harmonizing the law of secured transactions with respect to mobile
equipment.30 In response to Mr. Smith's proposal, Professor Ronald
Cuming of the University of Saskatchewan prepared a preliminary
report investigating the commercial need for an international
convention for secured transactions. 31 After the Cuming Report gave
a preliminary indication of the need for such a convention,
UNIDROIT established a Restricted Exploratory Working Group to
undertake a more in-depth analysis of the economic benefit that
would flow from harmonizing the law of secured transactions.32
26. Model Inter-America Law on Secured Transactions for Latin America,
Organization of American States website at http://www.oas.org/DIUCIDIP-VI-
securedtransactions-eng-home.htm.
27. Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la
Ley General de Tftulos y Operaciones de Cr~dito, del C6digo de Comercio y de la Ley de
Instituciones de Crfdito, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O]., 23 de Mayo de 2000
(Mex.); see also Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones del
C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal en Materia Comdn y para toda ]a Repdblica en Materia
Federal, del C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, del C6digo de Comercio y de la Ley
Federal de Protecci6n al Consumidor, D.O., 29 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.) (revising the
method of registering security interests).
28. Hale E. Sheppard, Overcoming Apathetic Internationalism to Generate
Hemispheric Benefits: An Analysis of and Arguments for Recent Secured Transactions Laws
in Mexico, 10 FLA. ST. U. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 133, 147-48 (2001).
29. Gopalan, supra note 7, at 256.
30. Id.; see also GOODE, supra note 12. at 3; Cuming 2000, supra note 9, at 1093.
31. Ronald C.C. Cuming, International Regulation of Aspects of Security Interests in
Mobile Equipment, I UNIF. L. REV. 63 (1990).
32. Id.
[44:339
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When the Working Group's report predicted that considerable
economic benefits would flow from a new convention, UNIDROIT
formed a Study Group to create the initial draft of an international
convention that would both modernize and harmonize the law of
secured transactions with respect to a narrow band of collateral for
which there existed a pressing need for such a convention.33 This
group of asset categories initially included airframes, aircraft engines,
helicopters, oil rigs, containers, railway rolling stock, registered
ships, and space assets. 34 These assets were selected because they
shared two distinct characteristics: first, these assets require
enormous levels of capital investment, and second, they are mobile
and tend to move through multiple jurisdictions in the ordinary
course of business (of course, in the case of space assets, the
equipment typically travels outside of all earth-bound jurisdictions).
The ultra-expensive nature of these assets demands a progressive
secured transactions law that facilitates raising capital for the
purchase or lease of such assets. A uniform international legal
regime would also serve to reduce the legal complexity that creditors
face when required to comply with the differing secured transactions
laws of multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, the types of collateral to be
covered by the convention are not assets that would be held by
consumers or small businesses, thus avoiding the contentious public
policy issues that arise with respect to enforcing security interests
against vulnerable parties. 35
In organizing the project to create this new international
convention, UNIDROIT took a highly progressive and practical
approach to making international law by granting private industry a
central role in the drafting process. The aviation industry, in
particular, had a strong voice in the negotiations through the
33. UNIDROIT Study LXXII-Doc.2, at 7 (1989). For subsequent studies regarding
the economic impact of the Cape Town Convention with respect to the aviation industry, see
Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter, Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment as Applicable to Aircraft Equipment through the Aircraft
Equipment Protocol: Economic Impact Assessment, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 339 (1998);
Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of International Secured Transactions
Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309 (1999). It was necessary to
limit the convention to certain high-value categories of collateral due to the likelihood that a
convention which embraced a broader spectrum of assets would create drafting problems
and diplomatic hurdles that would likely prevent the successful completion of the project.
Gopalan, supra note 7, at 263.
34. Stanford 1999, supra note 9, at 244.
35. See McGairl, supra note 16, at 462. Note, however, that broad public policy issues
continue to pose diplomatic challenges to the adoption of the Cape Town Convention,
particularly with respect to space assets (i.e., satellites) that are integral to the operation of
public health and education programs, such as India's tele-medicine and tele-education
systems. Some parties are concerned that the Cape Town Convention will allow creditors to
seize these assets and interfere with the related public programs.
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International Air Transport Association (IATA), an industry group
representing approximately 265 airlines, and an Aviation Working
Group (AWG), which was composed of representatives from the
giants of aviation manufacturing and finance and was co-chaired by
The Boeing Company and Airbus. 36 In the beginning of the process,
the AWG and the IATA worked with the representatives of the space,
railway, and other industries in an attempt to craft a single
convention that would serve the needs of all the industries.37 This
first phase of the drafting process continued for eight years until, in
1996, the process stalled due to the difficulty of creating a single set
of rules that would meet the different needs of the various types of
collateral involved and conform to the customary practices of the
different industries. 38
It was at this juncture that the creation of the Cape Town
Convention took its most interesting turn. Frustrated by the delay in
the drafting process, the AWG asked for the IATA's assistance in
modifying the process to allow the aircraft industry to move forward
independently. 39 Boeing and Airbus, the two co-chairs of the AWG,
were eager to put the convention in place for the clear purpose of
enabling their customers to more easily raise the funds needed to
purchase the new generation of passenger aircraft that are coming
onto the market. At that time, Boeing was in the final stages of
developing its new 787 Dreamliner which utilizes a new light-weight
construction system that promises to revolutionize the fuel efficiency
36. Further information regarding the structure and purpose of the IATA can be found
on the organization's website at http://www.iata.org/about/index. In addition to Boeing and
Airbus, the AWG included representatives from Bombardier, Boullioun Aviation, Citibank
N.A., debis AirFinance, DVB Bank, EMBRAER, GE Capital Aviation, General Electric
Company, International Lease Finance Corporation, JP Morgan, KfW Bankengruppe,
Morgan Stanley, RBS Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, Singapore Aircraft Leasing, SNECMA
Group, and Pratt & Whitney. See AWG Structure and Membership, Aviation Working
Group website, http://www.awg.aero/organisation.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
37. Clark, supra note 9, at 3-4.
38. Id. at 4-5; Cuming 2000, supra note 9, at 1094-95. The nature of the registry
where international interests would be registered in order to establish the priority of the
creditor's claim was one such issue that required different solutions with respect to each
asset class. See Unidroit News, 2 UNIF. L. REV. 308, 310 (1997). With respect to this issue,
the aviation industry had a specific need to preserve the domestic registration systems that
were already established for registering aircraft. Id. In order to allow for each industry to
create a registration system suitable to its needs, the Cape Town Convention states that each
equipment-specific protocol will establish its own registry and administrative procedures for
registration. Cape Town Convention, supra note 4, art. 17. Regarding other provisions
eventually incorporated into the Aircraft Protocol in response to the peculiar needs of the
aviation industry, see Gopalan, supra note 7, at 266-67.
39. E-mail from Jeffrey Wool, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP, to Mark J. Sundahl,
Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (Aug. 22, 2005, 11:33:59
EST) (on file with author); see also Clark, supra note 9, at 5; Stanford 1999, supra note 9, at
244; Goode, supra note 9, at 58.
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of commercial aircraft, while Airbus was building the largest (and
most expensive) airliner in history: the 555-seat A380 which has an
average price of $292 million.40 The convention would encourage
banks and investors to finance the purchase of these planes, thus
enabling Boeing and Airbus to recoup the high costs of developing
these new flying machines. 4 1
In response to Boeing's request, Lome Clark, then General
Counsel to the IATA, proposed a solution to the stalled
negotiations. 42 Specifically, Mr. Clark proposed that each industry
proceed independently with the drafting of an industry-specific
protocol that would supplement a base convention.4 3 This proposal
was incorporated into a memorandum, submitted jointly by the AWG
and the IATA to the UNIDROIT Secretariat on December 16, 1996,
recommending the adoption of this novel protocol structure in order
to allow industries the flexibility to develop at their own pace rules
that were responsive to the needs of their particular industry.44 The
proposal was adopted by the UNIDROIT Study Group during its
third session held in Rome in January 1997. 45 In light of the
importance of this proposal for understanding the origin and purpose
of the Cape Town approach, and because the memorandum is not
readily available, the text containing this recommendation is
reproduced here:
Work on the proposed Convention over the last
several years, as well as a realistic assessment of what
is likely to be required to produce a commercially
acceptable Convention, reveal the following in our
view. First, there is a need for specific rules
applicable to different types of equipment (e.g., rules
40. Airbus Raises Price for A380, TAIPEI TIMES, June 22, 2005, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/worldbiz/archives/2005/06/22/2003260309. For
information regarding the Boeing 787, see The Boeing Company website at
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/7e7/background.htmil. For information regarding the
Airbus 380, see the Airbus S.A.S. website at http://www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies/
a380.
41. It has been projected that the world's airlines intend to spend trillions of dollars
over the next several years as they replace their aging fleets. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The
Cape Town Convention: A New Era for Aircraft Financing, 18 AIR & SPACE L. 4, 4 (2003).
Boeing alone expects to sell 3500 787 Dreamliners over the next twenty years for an
approximate aggregate price of $400 billion. The Boeing Company website,
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/7e7/programfacts.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). If
broadly ratified, the Cape Town Convention could save customers billions of dollars in
financing costs. Saunders et al., supra note 33, at 340.
42. Clark, supra note 9, at 5.
43. Id.
44. AWG/IATA Memo, supra note 12, at 1-2.
45. Unidroit News, supra note 38, at 308,312.
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that (a) reflect specific industry consensus on
particular points and/or customary industry financing
techniques and (b) are needed to coordinate with other
international instruments applicable to one type of
equipment but not others). Second, there is a need to
organise and encourage appropriate industry and
specialised regulatory contribution to the project.
Third, it is essential to ensure that potential
Contracting States have the opportunity to adopt and
ratify the proposed Convention on an equipment-
specific basis (rather than, broadly, with respect to all
equipment). Fourth, it is important to anticipate the
possibility that different industries may require
different timetables to reach a sufficient level of
consensus to render the Convention commercially and
politically acceptable and to put in place a framework
which will provide flexibility should this be the case.
Our first recommendation, therefore, is that the format
of the proposed legal instrument be modified such that
the same is comprised of a base/umbrella agreement
which sets forth the basic legal framework applicable
to all categories of equipment ("base/umbrella
Convention") accompanied by equipment-specific
protocols, established from time to time, each of
which contains rules specifically applicable to a
particular category of equipment covered by the
proposed Convention ("protocols"). Once a protocol
enters into force, which it would do without reference
to other protocols, it shall automatically incorporate
the base/umbrella Convention, i.e., signature and
ratification of a protocol both include the
base/umbrella Convention, and is not conditioned on
or linked to signature and/or ratification of any other
protocol.46
In a footnote to this text, the AWG and IATA predicted that
the protocol relating to aircraft would be the first protocol to be
completed:
It is also evident that the level of emerging consensus
in the air transport industry is well ahead of that in
other industries at this stage. We have separately
suggested, therefore, that the initial protocol to be
46. AWG/IATA Memo, supra note 12, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
[44:339
HeinOnline  -- 44 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 352 2005-2006
THE "CAPE TOWN APPROACH"
developed (which may serve as an example for other
industries) and adopted diplomatically be the aircraft
equipment protocol.47
This new technique for crafting international law would allow the
different industries to proceed at their own pace and, perhaps more
importantly, would allow each industry to draft rules that were
tailored to their specific needs. 48  Although this base
convention/protocol approach was eventually adopted, the issue was
hotly contested. While the majority of the parties involved in the
drafting process favored the protocol approach, others supported a
47. Id. at 2 n.1.
48. The unique use of protocols by the Cape Town Convention is not the only feature
of the convention that expedited the successful negotiation of the treaty. The convention
also makes use of alternate provisions, "opt-in" provisions and "opt-out" provisions, in order
to overcome diplomatic opposition to certain problematic rules. An "opt-out provision" is a
provision that automatically applies unless a declaration is made. GOODE, supra note 12, at
29. In contrast, an "opt-in provision" will only apply if a declaration is made. Id. These
features of the Convention and protocols allow contracting states to weigh the commercial
benefits of certain policy-laden provisions against the public policies relating to such issues
and then, in some cases, choose to reinforce public policy (over promoting commercial
efficiency) by making a reservation with respect to a problematic provision or "opting out"
of the provision by means of a simple declaration. For example, a rule providing for the
prompt enforcement of a security interest upon the debtor's insolvency would conflict with
the policy espoused by many states to shield the assets of a bankrupt company from grasping
creditors. Because this conflict might prevent many states from ratifying the protocols, each
of the three protocols provide that the article governing the enforcement of a security interest
upon insolvency will only apply if a state "opts-in" to the provision by making a declaration.
Aircraft Protocol, supra note 4, art. XI(1); Space Protocol, supra note 8, art. XI(l); Rolling
Stock Protocol, supra note 8, art. IX(l).
Moreover, if a state does choose to "opt-in" to the, insolvency article, the article allows the
state to choose, by means of a declaration, between alternative articles: the "harder"
alternative requires the state to either (1) allow the secured party to take possession within a
stated time period or (2) require the debtor merely to give notice to the secured party that all
defaults will be cured, while the "softer" alternative allows the creditor to take possession of
the collateral only in accordance with applicable domestic law (which may not permit the
prompt enforcement of a security interest upon insolvency). Aircraft Protocol, supra note 4,
art. XI; Space Protocol, supra note 8, art. XI; Rolling Stock Protocol, supra note 8, art. IX.
This first alternative is clearly the more creditor-friendly provision, and thus the more
commercially expedient choice. However, if a state's public policy commitment to the
protection of ailing companies is greater than the perceived benefit of granting strong
repossession rights to the creditor, the state can choose the second alternative. If this option
were not granted, a debtor-friendly state may decide to forego ratification. Therefore, the
alternate provisions, while perhaps resulting in the sacrifice of commercial efficiency, allows
for broader ratification of the protocol. In addition, these insolvency remedies will only
apply if the contracting state has made a declaration to opt in to the article. As a result, a
state can choose not to undertake any obligations with respect to the enforcement of a
security interest after the debtor has become insolvent. The great flexibility of the protocols
with respect to these insolvency provisions recognizes the important public policy issues
surrounding the treatment of bankrupt companies. See Wool, Commercial Orientation,
supra note 9, at 92 (explaining that "[flew, if any, areas of commercial law are more policy-
laden than insolvency law"). Ultimately, this flexibility was built into the protocols in order
to avoid the catastrophic result that states might refuse to ratify a protocol that promoted
commercial efficiency over more debtor-friendly public policies.
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unitary approach pursuant to which a separate stand-alone treaty
would be drafted for each asset class. 49 The parties favoring a
unitary approach were concerned that a multi-instrument structure
would result in an instrument of unacceptable complexity.50 In the
end, a compromise was reached: although the convention would
employ a bifurcated structure utilizing multiple protocols, a
consolidated text would also be created for each protocol
(consolidating the provisions of the base convention and the
appropriate protocol) in order to make the applicable rules easier to
comprehend. 51
Following the adoption of the bifurcated approach,
UNIDROIT reorganized the drafting process: UNIDROIT was to
oversee the drafting of the base convention while an Aircraft Protocol
Group (APG) was formed to draft the Protocol to the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to
Aircraft Equipment (hereinafter the Aircraft Protocol). 52 The APG
consisted of the AWG and the IATA, but also included the
intergovernmental ICAO, which joined the project at this point for
the first time. 53 In 1991, both a base convention and the Aircraft
Protocol were completed and were submitted for signature at the
diplomatic conference convened for this purpose in Cape Town.
Thus, the protocol approach succeeded in "breaking the logjam" and
allowing the convention to be completed with respect to the first
category of assets.
II. THE MECHANICS OF THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION
The Cape Town Convention's use of protocols is unparalleled
in the history of international treaties. This section explores the
internal mechanics of the Cape Town Convention to better
understand how the Cape Town approach functions. However, in
order to highlight the innovative nature of the Cape Town
Convention's use of protocols, a brief description of the traditional
types of protocols is first provided.
49. See Cuming 2000, supra note 9, at 1100-01; see also Wool, Commercial
Orientation, supra note 9, at 90 & n.55.
50. Cuming 2000, supra note 9, at 1100-01.
51. Id.
52. See Aircraft Protocol, supra note 4; see also Clark, supra note 9, at 5.
53. GOODE, supra note 12, at 3; Clark, supra note 9, at 5. The ICAO is an
intergovernmental organization responsible for creating the technical standards applicable to
the aviation industry. Further information regarding the ICAO can be found on the
organization's website at http://www.icao.int.
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A. The Traditional Use of Protocols
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contemplates
the possibility that a treaty may consist of multiple instruments, as is
indicated in Article 2 which defines a treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation." 54  In fact, the use of a secondary instrument that
supplements a core treaty, generally referred to as a "protocol," is a
common feature of international law. Therefore, the use of protocols
by the Cape Town Convention is not unusual in itself. What is
revolutionary about the Cape Town Convention is the unprecedented
manner in which its protocols are used and the relationship of its
protocols with the base convention.
Prior to the Cape Town Convention, protocols have fallen
into one of four traditional categories: protocols of signature,
protocols of amendment, optional protocols, and protocols to a
framework convention. As we will see in the next section, the
protocols created in conjunction with the Cape Town Convention do
not fall within any of these categories, but instead constitute a new
type of protocol.
The first type of traditional protocol is the protocol of
signature. This type of protocol is presented for signature
simultaneously with the main treaty (hence its name) and is generally
used to address certain understandings, details, and technical matters
that are not appropriate for the main instrument. This type of
protocol aids in the elegant composition of a treaty by eliminating the
confusion that may result from including certain detailed technical
matters in the base treaty. For example, a signature protocol was
used to extend the protections against criminal activity found in the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation to criminal activity on oil and gas
platforms. 55 Since the types of crimes committed on oil platforms
differed from those committed on ships, it would have been unwieldy
to draft a single instrument that embraced both situations. 56 By
54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
55. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
56. The crimes against ships include the additional actions of interfering with
navigation instruments or supplying erroneous information to a ship which interferes with
navigation. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, arts. 3(1)(e)-(f), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
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addressing platforms separately, the task of drafting the treaty was
simplified. A protocol of signature may also be used when the
parties wish, for the purpose of clarity, to make a statement about the
main instrument in a separate document.57 This was the purpose of
the Protocol of Signature to the Convention relating to the
Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More than One State,
which only stated the single understanding that the provisions of the
convention did not alter certain existing international obligations of
the signatories. 5
8
The second type of protocol, a protocol of amendment, is
used to delete, modify, or otherwise change the provisions contained
in the base convention. 59 A classic example of this type of protocol
is the Protocol Amending the International Convention Relating to
the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships. 60 This
protocol amended the base convention by changing the method of
calculating the liability limits applicable to the owners of sea-going
ships with respect to personal injury claims and property damage.
Additional examples of protocols of amendment include the Protocol
Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation and the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage. 62
The third type of protocol, known as an optional protocol,
provides for obligations that supplement the obligations contained in
the base convention. An optional protocol differs from a protocol of
amendment in that it generally creates obligations that are additional
to the existing obligations under the base convention, rather than
deleting or altering existing provisions contained in the base
convention. One such example of an optional protocol is the
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
57. United Nations Treaty Reference Guide, http://untreaty.un.org/English/
guide.asp#protocols (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
58. Protocol of Signature to the Convention relating to the Development of Hydraulic
Power Affecting More than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, 77 L.N.T.S. 36.
59. Some sources recognize yet another type of protocol, the supplementary protocol,
which serves to supplement, rather than amend, the text of an existing treaty. See, e.g.,
United Nations Treaty Reference Guide, supra note 58. However, the distinction is not
helpful or necessary since an amendment to a treaty can just as easily consist of the addition
of supplemental text as well as the revision of existing treaty language.
60. Protocol Amending the International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the
Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, Dec. 21, 1979, 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No.
5-3 (7th ed. 1990).
61. Id. art. 2.
62. Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 705; Diplomatic Conference to Adopt a Protocol to
Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and to Adopt a
Convention on Supplementary Funding, Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1454.
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the Death Penalty. 63 Whereas the American Convention on Human
Rights only restricts the application of the death penalty to the most
serious crimes, the optional protocol gives signatories the opportunity
to undertake the more restrictive obligation to refrain entirely from
execution.64  Other examples of optional protocols include the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography. 65
The fourth traditional type of protocol is used in conjunction
with a framework convention and serves to provide more detailed
obligations to the general obligations set forth in the framework
convention (hereinafter referred to as a framework protocol). In this
type of treaty, protocols serve an essential function in providing
substance to existing treaty obligations and the framework
convention typically expressly anticipates the formation of such
protocols. 66 The most famous example of this framework approach
is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) which has been supplemented by the Kyoto Protocol. 67 The
FCCC, which addresses the reduction of greenhouse gases, sets forth,
among other things, the general requirement that industrial countries
establish national policies "with the aim of returning individually or
jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon
63. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, June 8, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1447.
64. Id. art. 1; American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica"
art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
65. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 15, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 281 (requiring signatories to
recognize the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women to consider communications from victims of discrimination); Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 16, 2000, 39
I.L.M. 1285 (requiring signatories to prohibit child prostitution, child pornography, and the
trafficking of children).
66. For example, Article 19(3) of the Convention on Biological Diversity states that
the parties:
shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate
procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field
of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting
from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity.
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 19(3), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 142. This
directive was carried out upon the creation of the Protocol on Biosafety.
67. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
[hereinafter FCCC]; Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
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dioxide and other greenhouse gases." 68  The subsequent Kyoto
Protocol is a far more detailed instrument that establishes precise
limits on the emission of greenhouse gases.69 Other examples of
treaties that adopted the framework structure include the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (supplemented by
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer)
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (with its accompanying
Protocol on Biosafety). 70
B. The Cape Town Convention
We now turn to the text of the Cape Town Convention to
examine more closely its unique use of protocols. The unusual
relationship between the Cape Town Convention and its
supplementary protocols arises from three innovative provisions.
First, Article 6, Section 2 of the base convention states that, with
respect to a particular type of asset, the provisions of the protocol
relating to such asset will trump any inconsistent provision contained
in the base convention. 71 Second, Article 49 provides that the base
convention will only enter into force with respect to a particular state
when that state has acceded to both the base convention and a
protocol and, moreover, the base convention will only enter into
force for that state with respect to that category of assets covered by
such protocol.72 Third, Article 6, Section 1 states that the base
convention and an individual protocol "shall be read and interpreted
68. FCCC, supra note 67, art. 4(2)(a).
69. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 3(1) (stating that "[tihe Parties
included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not
exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B...").
70. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26
I.L.M. 1516; Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1542; Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 822; Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 9, 2000, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf.
71. Article 6, Section 2 reads as follows: "To the extent of any inconsistency between
this Convention and the Protocol, the Protocol shall prevail." Cape Town Convention, supra
note 4, art. 6(2).
72. Article 49, Section 1 reads as follows:
This Convention enters into force on the first day of the month following the
expiration of three months after the date of the deposit of the third instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession but only as regards a category
of objects to which a Protocol applies:
(a) as from the time of entry into force of that Protocol;
(b) subject to the terms of that Protocol; and
(c) as between States Parties to this Convention and that Protocol.
Id. art. 49(1).
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together as a single instrument."73
Together, these three provisions create an unprecedented type
of international convention. The convention itself has no life of its
own, but only enters into force when a state ratifies a protocol. This
represents a more intimate (indeed, an inseparable) integration of the
base convention and protocol than has been seen in framework
treaties such as the FCCC. It is unparalleled that a convention cannot
itself enter into force until one of its protocols does so. In other
words, all base conventions created before the Cape Town
Convention have had a life of their own and could operate without a
subsequent protocol. Even a framework convention, which relies
heavily on its protocols to give substance to its obligations, can enter
into force before its protocols are created (although the resulting
obligations remain rather thin until they are supplemented by
protocols). A further distinction can be made between a framework
convention and the Cape Town Convention: although both a
framework convention and the Cape Town Convention anticipate and
rely on the creation of protocols, the Cape Town Convention also
anticipates that its protocols will contain provisions inconsistent with
those of the base convention. Moreover, the Cape Town Convention
expressly grants the protocols supremacy over any inconsistent terms
in the base convention. In contrast, a framework convention is
intended to operate harmoniously with protocols that supplement, but
do not override, the provisions contained in the convention.
The end result of this unique protocol structure is that the
aircraft, space, and rail industries are each able to create a protocol
specific to their respective industries which will operate in
conjunction with the base convention to form a set of rules that
govern security interests with respect to that particular industry. The
rules will consist of those provisions located in the base convention
as supplemented (or modified) by the provisions contained in the
relevant protocol. In effect, the Cape Town Convention will
ultimately create three separate legal regimes for the three asset
categories. This end result appears not to differ significantly from
what would have been achieved had three separate stand-alone
treaties been negotiated. In fact, the planned creation of three
consolidated texts that will merge the provisions of the base
convention with each protocol will 7 ive the impression that three
separate treaties are the end result. However, it is important to
realize that the three consolidated texts will share those provisions
73. Id. art. 6(1).
74. Regarding the issuance of a consolidated text that merges the Cape Town
Convention and the Aircraft Protocol, see GOODE, supra note 12, at 343.
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contained in the base convention to the extent that those provisions
are not modified by the protocols. Therefore, despite the creation of
three separate legal regimes, a high degree of uniformity is
maintained among the three rule sets. This ability to maintain a
substantial level of uniformity-while still permitting certain rules to
be tailored to the specific needs of different industries-is the great
achievement of the Cape Town Convention.
m. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE CAPE TOwN
APPROACH
The Cape Town approach possesses a number of advantages
that make treaty negotiation more likely to succeed. In addition to
providing added flexibility and speed, this new approach also allows
for the increased specialization of the law to meet the needs of
particular industries. Ultimately, these benefits of the Cape Town
approach promise to revive the use of treaties in international law,
which has given way to softer forms of law, such as model laws and
restatements. Of course, these benefits bring with them certain risks
as well, such as reduced efficiency and a greater fragmentation of the
law than is seen in traditional treaties. These advantages and
disadvantages of the Cape Town approach are discussed in greater
detail in the following sections.
A. Advantages of the Cape Town Approach
The following paragraphs explore the ten advantages of using
the Cape Town approach to structuring a treaty. These beneficial
features do not merely facilitate the formation of treaties, but also
assist with the delicate diplomatic task of achieving broad ratification
of the treaty after its formation.
First, the Cape Town approach brings greater flexibility to
treaty negotiations by allowing controversial provisions to be
addressed in multiple protocols. This has the salutary effect of
reducing the possibility that the negotiations will fail due to a
deadlock over a controversial provision. Under the traditional
"straightjacket" approach to international law (which requires one set
of rules to govern all matters that come within the scope of the
treaty), negotiations will stall when a single set of rules cannot be
devised to meet the needs of all participants in the negotiation
process. The Cape Town approach solves this problem by allowing
parties to take different approaches to controversial provisions
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through the use of multiple protocols. 75 Although some degree of
uniformity is sacrificed when different approaches to controversial
issues are permitted within the framework of the single convention, a
lethal deadlock over these controversial issues will also be avoided
and the treaty project will ultimately be saved.
Second, the Cape Town approach promotes uniformity across
the sectors that are subjects of the various protocols, while at the
same time providing the above-mentioned flexibility. 76 Although it
is true that the protocols allow for a divergence of rules between the
various protocols, the special rules contained in the protocols that
accommodate the idiosyncratic needs of a particular industry should
ideally be restricted only to those few rules that are necessary for the
proper operation of the treaty with respect to that particular industry.
Apart from these few special rules contained in the protocols, the
fundamental rules contained in the base convention should be
respected by the various protocols and therefore provide a uniform
foundation of international law. However, due to the controlling
nature of the protocols, this uniformity cannot be absolutely
guaranteed unless the base convention limits the protocols'
supremacy in the event of a conflict. If no such limitations are built
into the base convention, the drafters of a protocol will have the
freedom to modify any provision of the base convention.
Third, the Cape Town approach results in the speedier
implementation of the treaty because those parties who are in
agreement with respect to all treaty provisions can move forward to
complete a protocol governing their obligations without having to
wait for the objecting parties to agree to the terms. The objecting
parties are also free to create their own protocol (or protocols,
depending on how many diverging interests are represented at the
negotiating table). This allows for international law to be created on
a faster timetable, at least with respect to those sectors that can
successfully agree on the terms of their protocol. In the negotiation
of the Cape Town Convention, the aircraft industry took advantage of
this benefit by quickly completing the aircraft protocol while the
75. This advantage of the Cape Town approach was the main motivating purpose
behind its development in the context of the Cape Town Convention. By shifting the
controversial provisions to the industry-specific protocols, the impossible task of reaching
agreement with respect to each type of collateral was avoided. The provision regarding the
applicability of the convention to outright sales (as opposed to security and lease interests)
was one such controversial provision that was removed to the protocols. See, e.g., Aircraft
Protocol, supra note 4, art. III; see also S. Masuda, Revised Draft Articles of a Future
UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment: Comments,
UNIDROIT Study LXXII-Doc. 32 add. 1 (Jan. 1997).
76. See Stanford 1999, supra note 9, at 244.
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space and rail industries were still in the early stages of drafting their
respective protocols. 77 The space and rail industries are still in the
process of finalizing their protocols.
Fourth, the Cape Town approach promotes "hard"
international law by avoiding the "softening" of the law that results
when parties are forced to compromise in order to reach agreement
on a controversial provision. When using the Cape Town approach,
compromise is avoided because parties (or groups) that do not agree
on a provision can simply reserve that provision for the protocols
specific to each group. In a commercial law treaty, commercial
efficiency is sometimes best served when each industry is subject to
rules that have been tailored to its practices. The Cape Town
Convention allows these industry-specific rules to be placed in the
industry-specific protocols, and thus avoids the danger of sacrificing
commercial efficiency in the course of devising a single uniform rule
on which all parties can agree.
Fifth, the decision to employ the Cape Town approach
prevents the duplicative efforts that would result if different sectors
were to negotiate separate treaties. The creation of separate treaties
is another technique that could have been used to permit the aircraft
industry to proceed on its own when the unitary approach to the Cape
Town Convention broke down. However, the negotiation of three
separate treaties to govern the air, space, and rail industries would
have been much more complicated than negotiating a base
convention and separate protocols. The Cape Town approach is
more efficient because the provisions in the base convention, which
constitute the great majority of the rules, only need to be negotiated
once. Thus, the parties need not "reinvent[ ]... the wheel" by being
forced to negotiate these fundamental provisions separately in
individual treaties. 78 While the protocols will still be negotiated
separately, they contain far fewer provisions than a full treaty and
therefore negotiations should be short.
Sixth, the initial protocol can serve as a model for the drafting
of subsequent protocols. Thus, subsequent protocols can be drafted
quickly by using earlier protocols as templates.79  A related
77. According to Goode, the use of industry-specific protocols allowed the aviation
industry to move more quickly toward the establishment of the new legal regime without
needing to wait for the other industries to reach agreement regarding the provisions
applicable to their industries. Goode, supra note 9, at 58.
78. Stanford 1999, supra note 9, at 248 (quoting Roy Goode, The Preliminary Draft
UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment: The Next Stage, 4
UNIF. L. REv. 265, 271 (1999)).
79. The drafters of the Cape Town Convention's Space Protocol clearly benefited from
using the Aircraft Protocol as a model instrument, as evidenced by the Space Protocol's
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advantage is that working groups engaged in the drafting of
subsequent protocols can learn from practical experiences gained
from the application of protocols that have already entered into force.
Seventh, the success of an earlier protocol may serve to
convince other industries to join in the convention. 80 For example, if
the Cape Town Convention meets with great success by spurring the
flow of capital in the air, space, and rail industries, other industries,
such as the shipping or oil platform industries, may decide to draft
their own protocol in order to share in the convention's benefits.
Eighth, the Cape Town approach facilitates the diplomatic
task of persuading reluctant states to ratify the convention. This
advantage of the Cape Town approach results from the fact that the
base convention does not enter into force until a protocol is also
ratified. Thus, a reluctant state may be more amenable to ratifying
the base convention as a gesture of good will since ratification of the
convention would not impose any real obligations on the state until a
protocol was also signed. Once a party to the base convention, the
reluctant state, although not yet subject to any obligations, would
nevertheless become more deeply involved with the treaty process
and therefore become more likely to move forward in collaboration
with other states. In other words, the ratification of the base
convention would be a risk-free step forward for a reluctant state that
may eventually lead to the second step of ratifying a protocol with
binding obligations.
Ninth, the Cape Town approach facilitates the diplomatic
process of ratification by giving a state the option to ratify protocols
selectively rather than being faced with the "all or nothing" choice
that a state faces when considering a single-instrument treaty.8 1 For
example, in the context of a commercial law treaty, when faced with
a single-instrument treaty that would require the state to adopt a new
legal regime with respect to all commercial industries, the state may
refuse to ratify the convention if the new law is problematic with
respect to any one industry. On the other hand, the Cape Town
approach allows a state to "test the waters" by first ratifying only a
single protocol that governs a single industry. If this experiment is
successful, the state may then proceed to ratify other protocols
covering other industries and thereby expand its participation in the
convention. To take the Cape Town Convention as an example, if
the Aircraft Protocol succeeds in invigorating the airline industry in
adoption of the Aircraft Protocol provisions regarding insolvency. Aircraft Protocol, supra
note 4, art. XI; Space Protocol, supra note 8, art. XI.
80. Stanford 1999, supra note 9, at 248.
81. Id.
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India and leads to a growth in that sector of the Indian economy, the
Indian legislature may be more willing to ratify the Space Protocol in
the hopes of seeing similar growth in that industry and may even
entertain the idea of reforming its domestic secured transactions law
with respect to all commercial sectors.
Finally, the Cape Town approach has the advantage of
promoting the clear and elegant presentation of legal principles in the
base convention. This opportunity to state clearly the fundamental
principles of law in the base convention is made possible by the fact
that the complexities that clutter and cloud the basic legal principles
will generally be addressed in the various protocols, thus permitting
the base convention to stand out as a stark statement of fundamental
legal principles. 82 This clarity of language makes the convention
more easily understood by private parties involved in structuring a
transaction that relies upon the convention. The clear presentation of
legal principles in the base convention may also facilitate the prompt
and consistent enforcement of the convention in court due to the lack
of any ambiguity or complexity that may confuse or prolong the
judicial process.
B. Disadvantages of the Cape Town Approach
The unique structure of the Cape Town Convention was
invented to resolve the disputes and complexities that arose in the
course of the drafting process. The protocol approach adopted by the
Cape Town Convention succeeded in resolving these disputes and
brought with it the additional advantages described above. However,
despite the many advantages of the Cape Town approach, there are
also a number of potential disadvantages that must be taken into
account before deciding to apply this approach in the creation of
future treaties.
First, the argument can be made that the use of multiple
protocols causes greater complexity and fragmentation of the law.
The primary goal of international commercial law is to harmonize
laws across borders so that the complexity, and hence the cost, of
transnational business transactions is reduced. This complexity
results not only in commercial inefficiency, but may also prevent
states from ratifying the multi-instrument convention if their
representatives have difficulty navigating it.83 Although the Cape
Town approach achieves the goal of harmonizing domestic laws with
82. Goode, supra note 9, at 58.
83. Cuming 2000, supra note 9, at 1101.
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respect to a particular industry covered by a single protocol, it also
creates the potential for a lack of harmonization between the different
protocols since the drafters of each protocol have the freedom to
create rules that differ from those rules found in the other protocols.
Fortunately, this danger of fragmentation has not been realized in the
Cape Town Convention's protocols. The differences between the
protocols are limited to those that are demanded by the idiosyncratic
nature of the different types of assets. For example, the draft Space
Protocol contains a provision for placing command codes in escrow
so that the secured party can obtain the codes upon the debtor's
default in order to gain control of a satellite in orbit.84 Such a
provision has no place in the Aircraft Protocol. As another example,
the Aircraft Protocol contains an idiosyncratic provision stating that
an "interest in an aircraft engine shall not be affected by its
installation on removal from an aircraft."85  The only divergence
among the protocols that has the potential for creating undesirable
complexity is that the different institutions have been chosen for the
registry of the international interests with respect to the three asset
categories. An international interest in an aircraft will be registered
with the ICAO, while international interests in rolling stock and
space assets will be filed with another registrar.86 This lack of
uniformity is defensible since, at least with respect to the Aircraft
Protocol, the registries have existing ties to the related industries and
may therefore be the most suitable candidate for serving as registrar.
Moreover, this lack of uniformity does not create any significant
inefficiencies, since there is no great cost or complexity in
identifying the proper place to register an international interest in the
particular asset class. In most cases, a creditor will not be faced with
the task of filing an international interest in an aircraft and a
locomotive, but will be concerned with only one type of high-value
collateral. However, if the number of protocols expands significantly
84. Space Protocol, supra note 8, art. IX.
85. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 4, art. XIV(3).
86. Article 16(2) of the Cape Town Convention states that "[d]ifferent international
registries may be established for different categories of object an associated rights." Cape
Town Convention, supra note 4, art. 16(2). Pursuant to Article XVII(I) of the Aircraft
Protocol, the conference adopting the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol issued a
memorandum inviting the ICAO to serve as the registrar for international interests in
airframes, aircraft engines, and helicopters. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 4, art. XVII(1); see
also Resolution No. 2 of the Diplomatic Conference, in GOODE, supra note 12, at 343. On
June 2, 2004, the ICAO announced the selection of Aviareto, an Irish firm, to establish and
maintain the registry. Aviareto Selected to Establish International Registry System for
Interest in Aircraft, ICAO News Release, June 2, 2004, available at
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2004/pio200406_e.pdf. UNIDROIT has asked the United
Nations to serve as registrar for international interests in space assets. Space Protocol, supra
note 8, at xiii n.26.
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in the future to cover a broader variety of assets, each with its own
registry, the inefficiencies could begin to mount. Imagine, for
instance, if a creditor took a security interest in all assets of a debtor
and, in order to establish the priority of the creditor's interest, the
creditor was required to file his interest with a dozen different
offices. However, since there are no limits placed on the extent to
which a protocol may diverge from the rules set forth in the base
convention, the potential exists that future protocols will not
necessarily conform closely to previously-drafted protocols and will
diverge in a more significant way from the other protocols.
Second, although the Cape Town approach can allow for the
prompt completion of the initial protocol, the negotiation of
additional protocols can significantly delay the completion of the
entire project. For example, the Aircraft Protocol was quickly
completed, but the protocols to the Cape Town Convention with
respect to space assets and rolling stock are still in their preliminary
stages, and it is not clear when (or if) these protocols will be
finalized. The argument could be made that the impetus provided by
the aircraft industry for implementing the convention would have
better served the project as a whole if the protocol approach had not
been used. If a single-instrument approach had been retained, the
aircraft industry would have pressured the space and railway
industries to reach agreement on the outstanding issues so that the
convention could be completed and the aircraft industry could begin
to benefit from the new law. By breaking the convention into
separate protocols, this impetus provided by the aircraft industry was
lost and, although the aircraft industry was put on the fast track
toward completion of their protocol, the space and railway industries
were left to proceed at a slower pace. On the one hand, this can be
viewed as beneficial in that the space and railway industries were
given time to carefully craft protocols that were tailored to their
specific needs. However, the loss of the sense of urgency provided
by the aircraft industry could also be seen as depriving the other
industries of the motivation needed to complete their negotiations
and realize the benefits of the convention.
Third, the drafting of each protocol provides an opportunity to
renegotiate each provision of the base convention which may result
in lengthy negotiations and a further lack of uniformity among the
protocols. This risk arises from that provision of the Cape Town
Convention that allows the terms of each protocol to override any
provision of the base convention. 87 Although the purpose of the base
87. Cape Town Convention, supra note 4, art. 6(2). However, Herbert Kronke,
Secretary-General of UNIDROIT, has reported that there was an unwritten "awareness"
[44:339
HeinOnline  -- 44 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 366 2005-2006
THE "CAPE TOWN APPROACH"
convention is to provide a collection of fundamental rules which are
only to be modified to the extent necessary in order to meet the
special needs of the specific class of collateral addressed in each
protocol, this purpose will not necessarily be respected by the parties
to protocol negotiations, who may see each protocol as an
opportunity to renegotiate one or more of the fundamental provisions
contained in the base convention. This could, in theory, lead to the
renegotiation of all provisions contained in the base convention every
time a new protocol is drafted. Obviously, this opportunity to
renegotiate every provision could result in lengthy negotiations that
would nullify any procedural efficiencies gained in the application of
the Cape Town approach. If a protocol adopts provisions that depart
significantly from those of the base convention and other protocols,
further fragmentation of the law would also result.
Fourth, just as the Cape Town approach provides the benefit
of the "building block" effect whereby an initial protocol can serve as
a model for subsequent protocols and thus lead to the speedy
expansion of international law, this "building block" approach could
have negative effects as well. As seen in the three protocols to the
Cape Town Convention, the provisions contained in the protocols are
remarkably similar. It is clear that the working groups for both the
Rolling Stock Protocol and the Space Protocol relied heavily on the
Aircraft Protocol as a model. As mentioned above, this carries
certain benefits, such as promoting uniformity and speeding the
expansion of international law by preventing the need for each
protocol to reinvent the wheel. However, when using the prior
protocol as a model for subsequent protocols, danger also lies in the
possibility that a flawed provision contained in the initial protocol
will be adopted into those subsequent protocols. 88 This risk will be
reduced as time passes between the adoption of protocols, since such
passage of time will allow for the detection of flawed provisions
contained in the initial protocol. Nevertheless, working groups
should not hesitate to improve upon the provisions of previous
protocols (and should certainly avoid placing excessive trust in the
among the parties to the Cape Town Convention that the protocols "were not intended to
override the Convention as a whole, but that the Convention instructed users to look for
equipment-specific details in the Protocols." Report of the Third Joint Session of the Sub-
Committee of the ICAO Legal Committee and the UNIDROIT Committee of Governmental
Experts, UNIDROIT DCME Doc. IP/5 1 (2001), available at http://www.unidroit.org/
english/conventions/mobile-equipment/preparatorywork/jointsession3/report/l -report.pdf.
As discussed below, limitations on a protocol's ability to override the base convention
should in certain cases be included in the text of the convention.
88. Jeffrey Wool makes a similar point when he warns that softening the terms of the
Aircraft Protocol might create an undesirable commercial law precedent. Wool,
Commercial Orientation, supra note 9, at 91.
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infallibility of previous protocols).
Fifth, it may be more difficult to accumulate a clear body of
case law with respect to a treaty that utilizes the Cape Town
approach. This lack of clarity will result from the fact that case law
will be divided among issues governed by multiple protocols and it is
not clear whether a court's interpretation of one protocol should
necessarily guide a later court's interpretation of another protocol. In
order to avoid being bound by a prior decision regarding another
protocol, a court may argue that each protocol, when read together
with the base convention as a single instrument, constitutes a law that
is separate and distinct from the law that results from the reading of
the base convention together with another protocol.
Sixth, any amendment to the base convention will be
complicated by the fact that the drafters of such an amendment would
have to take into account its effect on each of the protocols. The
amendment of a single provision of the base convention may affect
each of the protocols in a different manner. For example, imagine
that the Cape Town Convention were amended (1) to allow for the
creation and enforcement of a security interest in all governmental
licenses relating to the debtor's operation of the collateral and (2) to
prohibit any protocol from overriding this new provision. This
would permit a secured creditor to sell the debtor's license to operate
an aircraft, locomotive, or satellite upon the debtor's default
regardless of any provision in the protocols that might conflict with
these amendments. 89  Such amendments would raise markedly
different policy issues with respect to the Aircraft, Rolling Stock, and
Space Asset Protocols. While the free transferability of
governmental licenses with respect to aircraft and rolling stock does
not raise serious issues of national security, the case is different with
respect to space assets. Without exception, states are sensitive to the
ability of a foreign person to utilize satellites to broadcast media to
their population due, at least in part, to concerns of political
propaganda and the possibility of resulting political unrest. National
security issues also arise from the use of satellites with remote
sensing capabilities which could be used to photograph military
installations. Finally, many countries rely on satellite systems to
operate vital public services such as air-traffic control, sea
navigation, or tele-medicine services. Therefore, the transfer of a
satellite that is used for such public programs to a creditor, along
with the license to utilize the satellite, could threaten to disrupt these
89. In fact, Article 2 of the Preliminary Draft of the Space Protocol reserves to
domestic law the transferability of governmental licenses needed for the operation of space
assets. Space Protocol, supra note 8, art. VII(3).
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important services. 90 This example illustrates how an amendment to
the base convention could have radically different implications for
different protocols and how the process of amendment may therefore
become more complicated than would ordinarily be the case under a
traditional treaty structure.
Finally, the periodic review conferences that commonly take
place to monitor the operation of international treaties would be more
complicated for those treaties that employ the Cape Town approach.
This increased complexity of the review process would arise from the
need to review the operation of each protocol independently as well
as the operation of the treaty as a whole. As mentioned above, each
protocol, when read together with the base convention, constitutes, in
effect, a separate "treaty," and each such "treaty" will have unique
successes and difficulties resulting from their differing provisions as
well as the differing needs of the sectors that they address. Any
problems that arise could stem either from an individual protocol or
from the base convention. Therefore, it would be advisable to have
separate review conferences for each protocol (attended by the parties
affected by such protocols) as well as a joint review conference for
the examination of the base convention. It would be logical to hold
the protocol reviews prior to the review of the base convention so
that by the time of the general review session, the attendees of the
protocol review sessions would have already reached some consensus
regarding existing flaws and whether such flaws lie in the base
convention as opposed to the individual protocols.
IV. THE BROADER APPLICATION OF THE CAPE TowN APPROACH
The remainder of this Article discusses how the Cape Town
approach can be applied in the creation of treaties concerning various
areas of law. Although this new method of making international law
was invented in order to solve the particular problems that had arisen
in the context of the Cape Town Convention, there is no reason to
restrict the Cape Town approach to the area of secured transactions,
or even to commercial law. In fact, those who in the future are faced
with the task of creating a treaty should consider the Cape Town
approach when selecting a treaty structure, particularly if the area of
law with which they are dealing involves unusual complexities or
particularly challenging diplomatic hurdles.
90. In order to protect against the disruption of vital public services, an Article XVI(3)
is under consideration which would allow a state by declaration to limit the enforcement of
remedies with respect to space assets used for such public services.
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The first of the following sections sets forth the six structural
features that are required (or recommended) for a treaty that employs
the Cape Town approach. Although some of these features do not
appear in the Cape Town Convention, their inclusion in future
conventions is recommended for the reasons provided below. The
second section describes those circumstances under which it is
advisable to employ the Cape Town approach and provides
illustrative examples of how the Cape Town approach might be
applied in various areas of law.
A. The Six Features of the Cape Town Approach
The following six features are required (or strongly
recommended) for a treaty that adopts the Cape Town approach. In
addition to a description of each feature, the rationale for including
the feature will be provided as well as a citation to model language in
the Cape Town Convention (when such language exists). 91
1. The base convention should contain all provisions that can
be agreed upon by all parties, while all controversial provisions that
are unlikely to gain support from all parties (without suffering
substantial dilution through negotiated compromise) should be
removed to the protocols. This basic feature of the Cape Town
approach promotes uniformity across industries by gathering certain
provisions in the base convention, while at the same time allowing
for flexibility by permitting each industry to adopt its own approach
to certain issues in its protocol.
2. The base convention should not come into force for a party
until that party has ratified both the base convention and a protocol.
When a party ratifies both the convention and a protocol, the
convention will only enter into force with respect to the ratified
protocol. This is another basic feature of the Cape Town approach
that makes it possible to move certain provisions to the protocols. It
is necessary to postpone the base convention's entry into force until a
protocol is also ratified because the base convention alone will not be
able to operate in isolation (since provisions that are essential to the
operation of the convention are likely to be contained in the
protocols). Article 49 of the Cape Town Convention provides model
language for a provision to ensure this delay of the base convention's
91. A treaty employing the Cape Town approach may include additional features
beyond those listed here, such as "opt-in" provisions or alternative provisions, in order to
introduce even greater flexibility to the treaty. However, such provisions are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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entry into force. 92
3. The protocol and the base convention should be
interpreted as a single instrument, and, in the event of a conflict
between the base convention and a protocol, the protocol must
control. This feature allows for a tremendous amount of flexibility
between protocols since the tailoring of each protocol to the needs of
its sponsors is not restricted by any existing provisions contained in
the base convention. Article 6 of the Cape Town Convention may
serve as a template for a provision that establishes the controlling
nature of the protocols. 93 As discussed above, the drafters of a base
convention may choose to limit the controlling nature of the
protocols by identifying certain essential provisions of the base
convention and prohibiting the protocols from contradicting these
essential provisions. Such limitations must be carefully crafted. On
the one hand, the identification of supreme principles that cannot be
infringed by industry-specific protocol provisions will ensure a
greater degree of uniformity across all industries. On the other hand,
there is a danger that thus curtailing the primacy of the protocols will
destroy the very flexibility that the Cape Town approach promises.
In order to ensure the success of future protocols, the base convention
must have sufficient flexibility to permit the drafters of future
protocols to create provisions that benefit the special needs of the
relevant industry. The Cape Town Convention takes a liberal
approach to the primacy of the protocols by imposing no restrictions
on the ability of the protocols to override the base convention, unless
the directive in Article 5(1), stating that when interpreting the
convention "regard is to be had to its purposes as set forth in the
preamble," is viewed as limiting the primacy of the protocols that is
established by Article 6. ' 9 4
4. The base convention should provide for the creation of a
consolidated text for each protocol. This text will present the reader
with a comprehensible compilation and reconciliation of the
provisions contained in the base convention and the relevant
protocol. A consolidated text will ameliorate one of the flaws of the
Cape Town approach, namely, the risk that confusion will result from
the use of multiple instruments. The Cape Town Convention does
not explicitly call for the creation of consolidated texts, although
Article 6(l)-which requires that the convention and each protocol
be read as a single instrument-suggests that a consolidated text
92. Cape Town Convention, supra note 4, art. 49.
93. Id. art. 6.
94. Id. art. 5(1).
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would be desirable. 95
5. The base convention should require that all protocols be
adopted pursuant to a fast-track procedure in order to avoid the risk,
discussed above, that lengthy negotiations will precede the creation
of each protocol.96 One possibility for such a fast-track procedure
would consist of the following three-step process.97  First, the
supervisory authority (such as UNIDROIT, in the case of the Cape
Town Convention) would organize a working group to create a draft
of the new protocol. Second, the draft would be circulated for
comments to all states that are parties to the base convention.
Finally, after any comments had been incorporated into the final
version of the protocol, accession to the protocol would take place by
means of a simple "opt-out" mechanism: any state that was already
party to the base convention would automatically accede to the new
protocol provided that the state makes no objection within a stated
period of time. 98
The risk of using such a fast-track procedure is that a new
protocol may include provisions that override essential, heavily-
negotiated provisions contained in the base convention and states
may object to an accelerated process that may result in a state's
automatic accession to a protocol that contains undesirable
provisions. In order to guard against this possibility, the base
convention could establish a dual-track procedure for the adoption of
future protocols. 99 The default approach would be the fast-track
procedure described above. However, in the event that a protocol
conflicted with an "essential provision" of the base convention, a
full-blown diplomatic conference could be called in order to consider
the merits of the protocol prior to signature by those states that
wished to accede to the protocol. In order for this dual-track
procedure to work, the base convention would have to list certain
"essential provisions" that, if contradicted by a .future protocol,
would prevent the fast-track adoption of the protocol. Of course, this
approach assumes that the protocols are permitted to override these
"essential provisions" in the first place. As discussed above, the
95. Id. art. 6(1).
96. Professors Chinkin and Kessedjian have proposed using a fast-track procedure for
the adoption of protocols to the Cape Town Convention for precisely this reason. Chinkin &
Kessedjian, supra note 9, at 326-27. The Rail Working Group has also championed this
proposal for a "streamlined" process for the adoption of future protocols. Comments on
Article 49 of the Draft Convention, UNIDROIT DCME Doc. No. 37, 1 (2001).
97. Chinkin & Kessedjian, supra note 9, at 326-27.
98. Id. Of course, other non-party states can accede by signing the base convention
and the new protocol.
99. Id.
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drafters of the base convention may choose to curtail the ability of
protocols to trump certain provisions of the convention. If such a
limitation is placed on the controlling nature of the protocol, a fast-
track procedure could be the exclusive method of adopting new
protocols, since the violation of essential principles found in the base
convention would not be permitted.
The Cape Town Convention adopted a moderately expedited
procedure for the adoption of future protocols but did not adopt the
"opt-out" procedure proposed by Professors Chinkin and
Kessedjian.10 The procedure first calls for UNIDROIT to create a
working group to prepare a preliminary draft of a new protocol.'0 1
UNIDROIT must then communicate the draft to all signatories of the
convention (as well as other interested states and organizations) and
invite these parties to participate in the preparation of the final
protocol. 10 2 Once the "competent bodies" of UNIDROIT deem the
draft "ripe for adoption," a diplomatic conference will be convened
for its adoption. 103
6. The base convention should provide that periodic
conferences for the review of each protocol should be held prior to
any conference for the general review of the base convention. As
discussed above, the existence of multiple protocols would make it
difficult to carry out a review of the base convention together with all
protocols at a single conference. By holding the review conferences
for the individual protocols reviews first, the attendees of the
protocol-specific conferences could focus on the issues relevant to
the particular protocol and then raise any concerns relevant to the
base convention at the main review conference.
B. When Should the Cape Town Approach be Applied?
The discussion to this point has focused primarily on the
application of the Cape Town approach to treaties dealing with
commercial law. However, there is no reason why the Cape Town
approach cannot be employed to form treaties in other areas, such as
environmental, insolvency, and criminal law. This section describes
the circumstances under which the adoption of the Cape Town
approach would benefit the negotiation of a treaty, regardless of the
area of law concerned.
100. Cape Town Convention, supra note 4, art. 51.
101. Id.art.51(1).
102. Id. art. 51(2)-(3).
103. Id. art. 51(4).
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Participants in a treaty negotiation should consider using the
Cape Town approach in the event that their initial attempt to create a
single-instrument treaty has stalled because they are unable to reach
agreement on certain controversial provisions. This failure to reach
agreement may stem from a variety of reasons, such as different legal
philosophies, conflicting public policies, or different practical needs.
When such an impasse is reached, the parties should analyze whether
the controversial provisions could be moved out of the base
convention to multiple protocols, each providing a different approach
to the problematic provisions. In the context of the Cape Town
Convention, one such problematic provision was the designation of a
registrar for the recording of security interests. Each of the industry
groups involved in the treaty process wanted an entity from its
industry to serve as the registrar. This issue, among others, led to the
likelihood that the formation of a unitary treaty would not be feasible
(or would at least be significantly delayed). The Cape Town
approach provided a solution by allowing the identity of the registrar
to be addressed separately in each of the industry-specific protocols.
As seen in the Cape Town Convention, industry-specific
protocols may aid in the negotiation of treaties concerning
commercial law. However, industry-specific protocols can also be
utilized in the employment of the Cape Town approach to treaties
concerning other areas of law. Assume, for example, that the
negotiation of a hypothetical treaty regarding environmental law has
reached an impasse because the different industries subject to the
treaty vary in their tolerance of restrictions on the emission of
pollutants. In order to resolve this conflict, the treaty could utilize
protocols that set forth different obligations for each industry
regarding the release of pollutants into the environment. In another
example, a treaty regarding labor standards could benefit from
industry-specific protocols if certain industries objected to certain
proposed labor standards, such as limiting an employee's workweek
to forty hours. If, for the sake of argument, the apparel industry
staunchly opposed a forty-hour workweek, while other industries
were willing to accept this standard, separate protocols could be
created to impose a lesser standard on the apparel industry's
operations worldwide. Although this would create some
fragmentation in the law and result in weaker standards for the
apparel industry, the treaty process would be salvaged.
Although the Cape Town approach lends itself to industry-
specific protocols, protocols could be used in other ways to resolve
disputes over controversial provisions. For example, the negotiations
of a treaty regarding criminal law may stall if experts drafting the
treaty are unable to agree on certain rules, such as whether juveniles
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were to be tried as adults. The experts in homicide law might argue
that juveniles should be tried as adults, while the experts in drug
offenses might take the opposite view. If these experts disagreed on
a sufficient number of such issues and the prospect of a unitary treaty
covering all crimes was dim, separate protocols could be created for
each crime. These separate protocols would allow the treaty process
to move forward more quickly by avoiding the need to reach
agreement on the controversial issues, such as the treatment of
juveniles. Each crime-specific protocol could contain its own rule
regarding these issues. Similarly, crime-specific protocols may be
appropriate for a criminal law treaty if agreement cannot be reached
regarding the definition of crimes. While agreement on the
definitions of piracy, homicide, and drug trafficking may be resolved
in the treaty negotiations, the definition of terrorism or other crimes
may evade agreement. Rather than halt the drafting process until all
parties agree on the definition of every crime, separate protocols
could be created for each crime, thus allowing the treaty to enter into
force with respect to those crimes for which a protocol can be
successfully negotiated.
In yet another example of how the Cape Town approach
could be applied in a different area of law, a treaty for the
harmonization of civil procedure could employ protocols that apply
different procedural rules to different types of actions in the event
that a unitary set of rules covering all actions was not attainable.
Separate protocols could conceivably be created for consumer actions
and actions involving merchants. These protocols could contain
different rules regarding discovery, the right to cross-examination,
burden of proof, or other issues that may demand different
approaches, depending on the special policy issues that arise in
consumer actions. For example, consumers may be given a broader
right to conduct pre-trial discovery than would a corporate plaintiff in
light of the need to protect consumers from potential abuse at the
hands of corporate merchants.
As these examples indicate, the first prerequisite for the
successful application of the Cape Town approach is the feasibility of
creating separate protocols in a manner that will have the desired
effect of resolving whatever disputes are preventing the creation of a
unitary treaty. However, the beneficial application of the Cape Town
approach also requires that all principals in a treaty negotiation agree
on a substantial number of provisions that will make up the body of
the base convention. If agreement cannot be reached on a significant
number of provisions, the base convention will be thin and any hope
of achieving a reasonable degree of uniformity will be lost. Without
a robust base convention, the Cape Town approach will result in
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nothing more than a series of independent treaties in the form of
protocols that are tied together by a weak base convention. In such a
case, there is little benefit to using the Cape Town approach since the
same result could be achieved simply by negotiating separate treaties.
The beauty of the Cape Town approach is that it provides the
flexibility needed to save a stalled treaty negotiation, while still
preserving a meaningful level of uniformity through the common
provisions contained in the base convention. In order to maximize
this uniformity, the drafters of a treaty employing the Cape Town
approach should expend every effort to devise uniform rules to
govern as many issues as possible, while allowing only the most
controversial provisions to be moved to the protocols for special
treatment. If applied in this manner, the Cape Town approach
promises to be a useful tool for resolving the disputes that threaten
the successful formation of a treaty.
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